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Abstract
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where
two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state,
and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from pri-
vate signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps
et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist
stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal realizations and
eventually coordinate on the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount
factors, we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs.
Keywords: repeated games, coordination, learning.
1 Introduction
We consider a repeated coordination game with observable actions and with unobserved
stage utilities that depend on an unknown, unchanging state of nature. The state is either
high (H) or low (L). In each period, players choose between two actions: invest (I ) or
not invest (N ). Not investing is a safe action that always yields stage utility 0, whereas
investment involves a cost. Investment yields a profit only if the state is high and the
other player also invests.
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In each period, each player observes a private signal regarding the state, and chooses
whether to invest or not. These signals are independent, and are observed regardless of
the actions taken by the players.1 Thus, for each player the uncertainty regarding the
state eventually vanishes, through the aggregation of these signals. However, because
signals are private, a player does not know what information the other player has, and
hence does not know exactly what his beliefs are. The question that now arises is: can
the players coordinate on the right action? That is, can they eventually coordinate on
investment when the state is high, and on not investing when the state is low? While
common learning (Cripps et al., 2008)—whose introduction was motivated by games of
this nature—is obtained in this game, it is far from obvious that coordination is possible.
In particular, it is not obvious that there exist stable equilibria, in which, when the state
is high, players can recover from events of low signal realizations that cause coordination
to stop (See, e.g., Ellison, 1994).
In the one-shot version of our game, when signals are strong enough, players can co-
ordinate on the correct action, with high probability; this follows from known results
on common-q beliefs in static Bayesian games (Monderer and Samet, 1989). In our re-
peated setting, since signals accumulate over time, private information does indeed be-
come strong. However, agents are forward looking, and so these results do not apply
directly. Moreover, a player’s beliefs are influenced both by his own private signals, as
well as the actions of the other player. Thus reasoning directly about players’ beliefs is
impossible, and one needs to revert to more abstract arguments, in the flavor of the social
learning literature, in order to analyze the dynamics. Indeed, the question that we ask re-
garding eventual coordination on the correct action closely corresponds to key questions
regarding eventual learning addressed in the social learning literature (e.g., Smith and
Sørensen, 2000).
We show that it is indeed possible to coordinate with high probability. In fact, we
construct equilibria with the stronger property of action efficiency, in which, from some
time period on, the players only choose the correct action. It thus follows that these
equilibria are stable: when the state is high, agents recover from events of low signal
realizations, and eventually coordinate. We further show that these equilibria achieve
near optimal payoff efficiency when the discount factor is high.
Static coordination games of this kind have become an insightful way to model many
1Equivalently, when players both invest they receive independent random payoffs that depend on the
state, but even when they do not invest, they observe the (random) payoff they would have gotten from
investing. One could alternatively consider a setting in which players receive signals from distributions
that also depend on their actions. We believe that our results hold as long as these signals are informative
for any action.
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real-world problems such as currency attacks (Morris and Shin, 1998), bank runs (Gold-
stein and Pauzner, 2005), political regime changes (Edmond, 2013), and arms races (Baliga
and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2004). Yang (2015) considers investment in a fluctuating risky asset, where
the payoff depends, as in our paper, on both the fundamentals (the state of nature) and
the action of the other player. A common assumption in this literature is that direct com-
munication is not allowed. We also make this assumption, and indeed our question is
trivial without it.
We describe both equilibrium strategies and payoffs. The construction of the equilib-
rium is not fully explicit; at some point we have to use a fixed point theorem to show
existence of the equilibria with the properties we desire.
The construction is roughly as follows: Initially, players play actionN for a sufficiently
long amount of time, enough to accumulate a strong private signal. After this, an invest-
ment phase begins, in which players invest if their beliefs are above some threshold level.
In the high state, both players are very likely to be above this threshold, while in the low
state they are both likely to be below it.
The investment phase continues until one (or both) of the players choose N , in which
case a cool-off phase of predetermined length is triggered. During the cool-off phase the
players do not invest, and instead again accumulate signals, so that, at the end of the the
cool-off phase and the beginning of the next investment phase, they are again likely to
choose the correct action.
In the high state, we show that each investment phase can, with high probability, last
forever. Indeed, we show that almost surely, eventually one of these investment phases
will last forever, and so the players eventually coordinate on the correct action. In the low
state, we show that eventually players will stop investing, as their beliefs become too low
to ever pass the investment thresholds. Thus, almost surely, our equilibria display action
efficiency, with the players coordinating on the right action.
Action efficiency is achievable for any discount factor. However, because of the initial
phase in which players do not invest, there is a significant loss in payoff for low discount
factors. For high discount factors, we show that there is almost no loss in payoff, as
compared to agents who start the game knowing the state, and coordinate efficiently.
To prove the existence of our equilibria, we first restrict the players to strategies that
implement the above described cool-off and investment phases, and apply a standard
fixed point theorem to find an equilibrium in the restricted game. We then show that
equilibria of the restricted game are also equilibria of the unrestricted game. To apply
this proof strategy we frame our discussion in terms of mixed strategies rather than the
more commonly used behavioral strategies.
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We shall now consider briefly some relevant literature. In Section 2, we formally
describe the model. Section 3 contains the analysis and construction of the equilibrium.
Section 4 discusses specific aspects of the model in greater detail and Section 5 concludes.
Proofs are relegated to the Appendix unless otherwise mentioned.
Related literature
There is work related to this paper in three different parts of the economics literature.
A very similar setting of a repeated coordination game with private signals regarding
a state of nature is offered as a motivating example by Cripps et al. (2008), who develop
the notion of common learning to tackle this class of repeated games. We believe that the
techniques we develop to solve our game should be easily applicable to theirs.
The literature on static coordination with private information mentioned earlier in the
introduction has dynamic extensions. The dynamic game of regime change by Angeletos
et al. (2007), for example, has a similar set-up in terms of private signals and publicly
observable (in aggregate) actions, in a repeated game with a continuum of agents. In their
setting, the game ends once the agents coordinate on a regime change. In contrast, in our
setting one period of successful investment does not end the game. Chassang (2010) is
also related, but differs from our setting in that is has a state of nature that changes over
time, and an action that is irreversible.
The recent literature on folk theorems in repeated settings is possibly the closest, in its
statement of the problem addressed, to our paper. The papers we consider in some detail
below are Yamamoto (2011) and Sugaya and Yamamoto (2013). Most of the other existing
work on learning in repeated games assumes that players observe public signals about the
state, and focuses on equilibrium strategies in which players ignore private signals and
learn only from public signals (Wiseman, 2005, 2012; Fudenberg and Yamamoto, 2010,
2011).
Yamamoto (2011) and Sugaya and Yamamoto (2013) are the closest papers to ours.
However, these papers are significantly different along the following dimensions. First,
they focus on ex-post equilibria, which are defined as sequential equilibria in the in-
finitely repeated game in which the state θ is common knowledge for each θ. Since an
ex-post equilibrium is a stronger notion, their folk theorem (based on ex-post equilibria)
implies the folk theorem based on sequential equilibria. Their results do not apply to our
setting, since they make assumptions that our model does not satisfy. Second, for their
folk theorem, they assume that the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs has
the dimension equal to the number of players for every state. However, this assumption
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fails to hold in our environment. Third, their folk theorem fails to hold when there are
two players and private signals are conditionally independent. Since our work considers
such cases, it is complementary to theirs also in this sense.
2 Model
We consider an infinitely repeated game of incomplete information. There is an unknown
payoff-relevant binary state of nature θ ∈ Θ = {H,L}. Time is discrete and the horizon is
infinite, i.e., t = 1,2,3.... There are two players N = {1,2}. Each player i, at every period
t, chooses an action ai ∈ Ai = {I ,N }. Action I can be interpreted as an action to invest
and action N as not invest. We assume that the state of nature is determined at period
t = 1 and stays fixed for the rest of the game. Further, both players hold a common prior
(p0,1 − p0) ∈ ∆(Θ), where p0 ∈ (0,1) is the initial probability that the state is θ = H . The
payoff to player i, in every period, from any action profile a ∈ A = A1×A2 depends on the
state and is defined by a per-period payoff function ui(a,θ). The following table shows
the payoffs from actions associated with states θ =H and θ = L respectively:
I N
I 1− c,1− c −c,0
N 0,−c 0,0
Table 1: θ =H
I N
I −c,−c −c,0
N 0,−c 0,0
Table 2: θ = L
Here c ∈ (0,1) is a cost of investing, and so investment is beneficial if and only if the
other player chooses to invest and the state is H . In this case both players obtain a payoff
equal to 1− c. In the state H , there are two stage-game equilibria in pure strategies, (I , I )
and (N,N ), where the former is Pareto dominant. In the state L, however, action N is
strictly dominant, thereby the unique stage-game equilibrium being (N,N ). We assume
that stage utilities are not observed by the agents.
Private Signals. At every period t, each player i receives a private signal xit ∈ X about the
state, where X is a finite signal space.2 The signal distribution under the state θ is given
by fθ ∈ ∆(X). We assume that conditional on the state θ, private signals are independent
across players and across time. We also assume that fH , fL. This allows both players
to individually learn the state of the nature asymptotically via their own private signals.
2The assumption that the signal space is finite is not crucial for establishing our results. The key feature
of the signal distributions that we exploit is that they generate bounded likelihood ratios.
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xit−1
(ait−1,ajt−1)
xit
(ait ,ajt)
time
Figure 1: Timeline
Finally, we assume full support: fθ(x) > 0 for all θ ∈Θ and for all x ∈ X. Hence, no private
signal fully reveals the state of nature.
Histories and Strategies. At every period t, each player i receives a private signals xit
and then chooses action ait . Under our assumption of perfect monitoring of actions,
player i’s private history before taking an action ait at period t is hence hit = (a
t−1,xti ),
where we denote by at−1 = (a1,a2, . . . ,at−1) ∈ A
t−1 the past action profiles and by xti =
(xi1,xi2, . . . ,xit) ∈ X
t player i’s private signals. Let Hit = A
t−1 ×Xt be the set of all period-t
private histories for player i. Note that action history at−1 is publicly known. Figure 1
depicts the sequence of events. A pure strategy for player i is a function si :
⋃
tHit → Ai .
Let Si denote the set of all player i’s pure strategies. We equip this set with the product
topology. Let Σi = ∆(Si) denote the set of mixed strategies, which are the Borel probability
measures on Si .
Payoffs and equilibria. Both players evaluate infinite streams of payoffs via discounted
sum where the discount factor is δ ∈ (0,1). Hence, in the infinitely repeated game, if
the players choose a path of actions (at)t ∈ A
∞, then player i receives long-run payoff∑
t≥1(1−δ)δ
t−1ui(at ,θ) when the state is θ. Hence, under a (mixed) strategy profile σ, the
long-run expected payoff to the player is
Eσ
[∑
t≥1
(1− δ)δt−1ui(at ,θ)
]
(1)
where the expectation operator, Eσ , is defined with respect to the probability measure
Pσ induced by the strategy profile σ on all possible paths of the repeated interaction
Ω = Θ × (X2)∞ ×A∞. As usual, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player has a
profitable deviation. In our setting, we show that for every Nash equilibrium there exists
an outcome-equivalent sequential equilibrium (Lemma 5).
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we study equilibria of the infinitely repeated game. Our goal is to establish
the existence of equilibria that are efficient. We shall consider two notions of efficiency,
namely action efficiency and payoff efficiency. Action efficiency requires that player ac-
tions converge almost surely to the correct actions, i.e., both players eventually invest
(resp. not invest) under state θ = H (resp. θ = L). Payoff efficiency requires that players
obtain payoffs close to efficient payoffs, i.e., in state θ = H (resp. θ = L), ex-ante long run
payoffs of both players are close to 1 − c (resp. close to 0). The main result is that action
efficiency can always be obtained in equilibrium and payoff efficient equilibria exist for
discount factor δ close to one.
One-period Example
To informally illustrate the nature of incentives that arise in our coordination framework,
we first consider the scenario when there is only a single period of interaction. Suppose
that players follow a threshold rule to coordinate on actions. That is, for each player i,
there exists a threshold belief p¯i such that player i invests (does not invest) if his belief
about the state θ =H is above (below) the threshold. For simplicity, let us further assume
that no posterior belief after the one period signal equals the threshold. Now, if player i’s
belief pi is above his threshold and he chooses to invest, then he obtains a payoff equal to
piP[pj > p¯j | θ =H]− c,
where P[pj > p¯j | θ = H] is the probability that player j invests conditional on the state
θ =H . Since player i obtains payoff of 0 from not investing, he has an incentive to invest
only if this probability is high enough. Moreover, even if it were the case that the other
player invests for sure in the state H , player i would still need his belief pi to be above c
in order to find investment optimal. Hence, when player j invests with high probability
in the state H , the threshold of player i would be close to c. Likewise, if player j invests
with low probability in the stateH , the threshold would be close to one. There may hence
arise multiple equilibria. There could be an equilibrium with low thresholds where both
players invest with high probability in the state H . There could also be an equilibrium
with high thresholds where this probability is low or even zero.3
Note the roles played by both a player’s belief about the state, and by his belief about
3This multiplicity arises from the assumption that investment cannot be strictly dominant in either
state, unlike global games (Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993).
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his opponent’s beliefs. If player i believes that the state is θ = H with probability 1, his
payoff from investing is P[pj > p¯j | θ = H] − c. Thus, he invests only if he believes that
player j invests with probability at least c. On the other hand, if he believes that player j
chooses to invest with probability 1, his payoff from investing is pi − c. Thus, he invests
only if he believes that the state is θ = H with probability at least c. This demonstrates
that not only do players need high enough beliefs about the state H in order to invest, but
also need to believe with high probability that their opponents hold high beliefs as well.
Both players invest only if they acquire “approximate common knowledge” of the state
being θ = H (Monderer and Samet, 1989). This naturally raises the question of whether
an analogue of this insight obtains in the repeated game we consider here.
Now, imagine that the first period signals were informationally very precise. This
would allow a very high probability of investment in the state H in the low threshold
equilibrium. This suggests that if such precise signals were the result of accumulating a
series of less precise ones, say received over time, the probability of coordinating on the
right actions would be very high. In the infinitely repeated game, such a situation can
arise, for example, when players choose to not invest and individually accumulate their
private signals, followed by an attempt to coordinate with a low threshold.
In the dynamic context, because players are forward looking, such a threshold rule
would also depend on how players behave in the future. For example, if non-investment
triggers both players to not invest forever, the thresholds for investment would be low.
This is because non-investment would yield a payoff of 0 whereas investment would yield
expected payoff for the current period and a non-negative future continuation payoff (be-
cause a player can always guarantee himself a payoff of 0 by never investing on his own).4
However, having non-investment trigger players not investing forever is not compatible
with action efficiency, which requires the players to invest eventually in the high state.
Thus action efficient equilibria must somehow incentivize players to revert back to in-
vesting.
3.1 Cool-off Strategies
We will focus on a particular class of strategies which we call cool-off strategies, in which
play involves two kinds of phases: cool-off phases and investment phases. In a cool-off
phase, both players accumulate private signals while playing action profile (N,N ) for a
certain period of time. After the cool-off phase, they enter an investment phase in which
4In the model of Angeletos et al. (2007), once sufficiently many players invest (or attack a status quo),
they receive payoffs and the game ends. Hence, the issue of “repeated” coordination studied here does not
arise in their work.
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each player chooses action I with positive probability. In an investment phase, if the
players’ play action profile (I , I ) then they remain in the investment phase, otherwise
they restart a new cool-off phase.
Cool-off strategies are based on the notion of a cool-off scheme, which is defined as a
partition (C,I ) of the set of all action histories: the set of cool-off histories C and the set
of investment histories I . This classification is carried out by means of a cool-off function
T : N → N which labels each action history at as being part of a cool-off phase or not.
Formally, this is done as follows.
Definition 1. A cool-off scheme (C,I ) induced by a cool-off function T :N→N is recursively
defined as follows:
1. The empty action history is in C.
2. For an action history at such that t ≥ 1:
(a) Suppose that at−1 ∈ I . Then, at ∈ I if at = (I , I ) and a
t ∈ C otherwise.
(b) Suppose that at−1 ∈ C and that there exists a subhistory of at in I . Let as−1 be the
longest such subhistory. Then, at ∈ C if t ≤ s +T (s)− 1 and at ∈ I if t > s +T (s)− 1.
(c) Suppose that at−1 ∈ C and that there does not exist a subhistory of at in I . Then,
at ∈ C if t ≤ T (1) and at ∈ I if t > T (1).
Each series of action histories in the sets C and I is called a cool-off phase and an investment
phase respectively.
Figure 2 depicts a cool-off scheme. Initially, players are in a cool-off phase for T (1)
periods. At period T (1) + 1, they are in the investment phase. If both players choose to
invest, then they stay in the investment phase. If at some point during the investment
phase, say at period s, at least one player chooses to not invest, then another cool-off
phase begins at this action history as for T (s) periods. Another investment phase starts at
period s +T (s).5
As is clear from Definition 1, the cool-off scheme (C,I ) induced by any cool-off func-
tion T satisfies both C ∩ I = ∅ and C ∪ I =
⋃
t≥1A
t . Further, whether an action history at
is in a cool-off phase or in an investment phase depends only on the cool-off function T
but not on strategies.
Definition 2. Fix a cool-off function T . We define the set Si(T ) as the set of all player i’s pure
strategies si ∈ Si with the following properties:
5Players may never invest in an investment phase. For example, if action aT (1)+1 , (I , I) then this invest-
ment phase ends immediately, and a new cool-off phase starts at period T (1) + 2.
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a1 a2 ... aT (1)
aT (1)+1 aT (1)+2 ... as−1
as as+1 ... as+T (s)−1
as+T (s) ...
as , (I , I)
Figure 2: Cool-off Schemes
1. During a cool-off phase player i chooses action N for any realization of their private
signals. That is, if at−1 ∈ C, then si(a
t−1,xti ) =N for any x
t
i ∈ X
t .
2. In any action history at−1 in which any player chose I during a cool-off phase at some
time τ < t, player i chooses N , i.e., si(a
t−1,xti ) =N .
Let Σi(T ) be the set of mixed strategies whose support is contained in Σi(T ).
The following claim is immediate.
Claim 1. Fix a cool-off function T . Then, the set Σi(T ) is a closed and convex subset of the set
Σi .
As stated above, the investment phase corresponds to action histories in which players
would invest with positive probability. We have not required that this be the case in
Definition 2. For example, the trivial equilibrium, in which both players never invest,
belongs to the class Σi(T ). Ideally, we would like strategies in the set Σ1(T )×Σ2(T ) to be
such that whenever the players are in an investment phase, there is a large probability of
investment. Hence, we focus on a smaller class of strategies, which we introduce after the
following definitions.
A private history (at−1,xti ) is said to be consistent with a pure strategy si if for all τ < t
it holds that s(aτ−1,xτi ) = a
τ
i . A private history (a
t−1,xti ) is said to be consistent with a
mixed strategy σi if it consistent with some pure strategy si in the support of σi . Here, by
support we mean the intersection of all closed subsets of Si which have probability one
under σi ; this is equivalent to requiring that for each time t the restriction of si to time
periods 1 to t is chosen with positive probability. Given a private history (at−1,xti ) that is
10
consistent with σi , we can define the (in a sense) conditional probability of taking action
I , which we denote by σi(a
t−1,xti )(I ), as
σi(a
t−1,xti )(I ) =
σi(si is consistent with (a
t−1,xti ) and si(a
t−1,xti ) = I )
σi(si is consistent with (at−1,x
t
i ))
·
Note that this is simply the probability of choosing I at private history (a−1,xti ) under
the behavioral strategy that corresponds to σi (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).
We say that a action history at−1 is consistent with σi if (a
t−1,xti ) is consistent with σi
for some xti that occurs with positive probability. Since private signals are conditionally
independent, we can define the conditional probability of investing at a consistent at−1 in
the high state as
σi(a
t−1)(I |H) =
∑
xti∈X
t
f H (xti )
[ t−1∏
τ=1
σi(x
τ
i ,a
τ−1)(aiτ)
(
σi(x
t
i ,a
t−1)(I )
)]
∑
xti∈X
t
f H (xti )
[ t−1∏
τ=1
σi(x
τ
i ,a
τ−1)(aiτ)
] ·
This is well-defined because at−1 is consistent with σi . The important property that we
will need, is that for any strategy profile σ = (σi ,σj ) in which a given action history a
t−1 is
reached with positive probability, it holds that
Pσ
[
ait = I | θ =H,a
t−1
]
= σi(a
t−1)(I |H). (2)
Hence, the conditional probability Pσ
[
ait = I | θ =H,a
t−1
]
is independent of σj . We show
this formally in the appendix (see Claim 3).
Definition 3. Fix a cool-off function T and a constant ε > 0. We define the set Σi(T ,ε) ⊂ Σi(T )
as the set of all player i’s cool-off strategies σi with the following properties:
1. σi ∈ Σi(T ).
2. In an investment phase, player i invests with probability at least 1−ε, conditioned on the
state θ =H . That is, for any action history at−1 ∈ I which is consistent with σi ,
σi(a
t−1)(I |H) ≥ 1− ε. (3)
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As we noted above in (2), the second condition is equivalent to
Pσ
[
ait = I | θ =H,a
t−1
]
≥ 1− ε.
The following claim is again straightforward to prove.
Claim 2. Fix a cool-off function T and a constant ε > 0. Then, the set Σi(T ,ε) is a closed and
convex subset of the set Σi .
3.2 Cool-off Equilibria as Fixed Points
We have introduced the key class of strategies. In what follows, we will find an equilib-
rium in this class. To do this, we make an appropriate choice of a cool-off function T and
an ε, and restrict the players to choose strategies from Σi(T ,ε). Since this set is closed
and convex (Claim 2), we can appeal to a standard fixed point argument to show the ex-
istence of an equilibrium. We next show that this equilibrium in restricted strategies is,
in fact, still an equilibrium when the restriction is removed. Finally, we show that in this
equilibrium, players will eventually coordinate on the right action. Moreover, when the
players are very patient, the equilibrium achieves close to efficient payoffs.
Lemma 1 (Continuation Values). Let σj be any mixed strategy of player j. Fix an action his-
tory at−1. Then the continuation value of player i at the action history at−1 is a non-decreasing
convex function of his belief in the state θ =H .
Lemma 2 (Threshold Rule). For each c,δ ∈ (0,1), let T0 ∈N be large enough and ε > 0 small
enough that
δT0 < (1− δ)(1− c− ε). (4)
Let a cool-off function T be such that T (t) ≥ T0 for all t ≥ 2. Fix player j’s strategy σj ∈ Σj(T ,ε)
and an action history at−1 ∈ I . Then, for every best response of player i, there exists a threshold
pi such that at action history at−1 player i invests (resp. does not invest) if her belief in the state
θ =H is above (resp. below) the threshold pi.
Lemma 2 implies that for an appropriate choice of T and ε, it holds in every equilib-
rium of the game restricted to S (T ,ε) = Σ1(T ,ε)×Σ2(T ,ε) that both players play threshold
strategies: in each history each player has a threshold such that he invests above it and
does not below it. Thus, when a player observes another player investing, he updates up-
wards (in the sense of stochastic dominance) his belief regarding the other player’s signal.
A consequence of this is the following corollary, which states this idea formally.
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In what follows, we shall denote by pit the private belief of player i at period t before
choosing action ait . The belief pit is computed based on player i’s private history hit =
(at−1,xti ). Hence, pit = P[θ = H | hit]. Finally, for convenience, we shall sometimes write
the expectation operator Eσ and probability function Pσ without the subscript σ simply
as E and P.
Corollary 1 (Monotonicity of Expected Beliefs). For each c,δ ∈ (0,1), let T0 ∈ N be large
enough and ε > 0 small enough so as to satisfy condition (4) of Lemma 2. Let T be a cool-off
function such that T (t) ≥ T0 for all t ≥ 2. Then, in every equilibrium of the game restricted
to Σ1(T ,ε) ×Σ2(T ,ε) it holds that if a
s−1 extends at−1 with both players investing in periods
t, t +1, . . . , s − 1, then
E
[
pis | θ =H,a
s−1
]
≥ E
[
pit | θ =H,a
t−1
]
.
The next two propositions are the key ingredient in showing that an equilibrium in
our restricted game is also an equilibrium of the unrestricted game.
Proposition 1. For each c,δ ∈ (0,1), take T0 ∈ N large enough and ε > 0 small enough such
that
c
(1− ε)− (1− c)δT0/(1− δ)
< c(1 + 2ε) < 1− ε. (5)
Let a cool-off function T :N→N be such that T (t) ≥ T0 for all t ∈N. Fix player j’s strategy
σj ∈ Σj(T ,ε) and an action history a
t−1 ∈ I . Then, in every best response of player i, if
E
[
pit | θ =H,a
t−1
]
> 1− ε2,
then player i invests with probability at least 1−ε in the state θ =H . Moreover, player i invests
if his private belief is above c(1 + 2ε).
Proof. Denote by p the supremum of the beliefs in which player i does not invest at the
action history at−1. Given the belief p, the payoff from investing is at least (1 − δ)(−c +
p(1 − ε)), while the payoff from not investing is at most pδT0(1 − c). Thus, we have that
(1− δ)(−c+ p(1− ε)) ≤ pδT0(1− c). Rearranging the terms, we have
p ≤
c
(1− ε)− (1− c)δT0/(1− δ)
,
which implies that p < c(1 + 2ε) by condition (5). Hence, player i invests if his private
belief pit is above c(1 + 2ε).
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It follows from Markov’s inequality that
P(pit ≤ p | θ =H,a
t−1) = P(1− pit ≥ 1− p | θ =H,a
t−1) ≤
E[1− pit | θ =H,a
t−1]
1− p
.
Since p < c(1 + 2ε) and E[pit | θ =H,a
t−1] > 1− ε2,
E[1− pit | θ =H,a
t−1]
1− p
<
1− (1− ε2)
1− c(1 + 2ε)
< ε,
where the latter inequality follows by condition (5). Hence, P(pit ≤ p | θ = H,a
t−1) ≤ ε.
That is, player i invests with probability at least 1− ε. 
Proposition 2. For each c,δ ∈ (0,1), let T0 ∈N and ε > 0 be such that condition (4) in Lemma
2 is satisfied. Then, there is a cool-off function T : N → N with T (t) ≥ T0 for each t ≥ 2
such that, in every equilibrium strategy profile σ ∈ Σ1(T ,ε) ×Σ2(T ,ε), it holds in every action
history at−1 ∈ I that for each i = 1,2,
Eσ
[
pit | θ =H,a
t−1
]
> 1− ε2.
Proof. Fix T0 ∈N and ε > 0. Since private signals are bounded, for each s ≥ 1, there exists
p
s
> 0 such that for each i = 1,2,
P[pis > ps
] = 1.
irrespective of the strategies of the players. For example, p
s
could be defined as the belief
that a player would have if he observed both players received the worst signal repeatedly
up to period s, where the worst signal is defined as the one which has the lowest likelihood
ratio. Note that p
s
only depends on the period s and not on the action history or the
private history of any player.
We now construct the cool-off function T . For each s ≥ 1, define T (s) ≥ T0 large enough
to be such that if a cool-off phase were to begin at period s and a player’s belief were p
s
,
then when the cool-off phase ends at time period s+T (s)−1, the expectation of a player’s
private belief conditional on θ =H would be above 1− ε2.
For this cool-off function T , from Corollary 1 it follows that for each equilibrium
strategy profile σ ∈ Σ1(T ,ε)×Σ2(T ,ε) and action history a
t−1 ∈ I , we have that
Eσ
[
pit | θ =H,a
t−1
]
> 1− ε2,
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which completes the proof. 
Now we prove the existence of equilibria in cool-off strategies. Applying a fixed-point
theorem to the game restricted to Σ1(T ,ε) ×Σ2(T ,ε), we find an equilibrium σ
∗ ∈ S (T ,ε).
We then show that this equilibrium remains an equilibrium of the unrestricted game,
using Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3. For each c,δ ∈ (0,1), let T0 be large enough and ε small enough so as to satisfy
condition (4) in Lemma 2 and condition (5) in Proposition 1. Then, there exists a cool-off
function T with T (t) ≥ T0 for all t ≥ 2 and there exists an equilibrium σ
∗ = (σ∗i ,σ
∗
j ) such that
σ∗i ∈ Σi(T ,ε) and σ
∗
j ∈ Σj (T ,ε).
3.3 Efficiency
Theorem 1 (Action Efficiency). For each c,δ ∈ (0,1), there exist a cool-off function T , a con-
stant ε > 0 such that for any equilibrium σ∗ ∈ S (T ,ε), players eventually choose the right
actions. That is, the equilibrium action profile converges to (I , I ) in the state θ = H and to
(N,N ) in the state θ = L almost surely.
Proof. The underlying probability space for defining the events of interest will be the set
of all outcomesΩ =Θ×A∞×(X2)∞. Let σ∗ ∈ S (T ,ε) be any equilibrium. Define the events
A∞I =
{
ω ∈Ω : lim
t→∞
at(ω) = (I , I )
}
, A∞N =
{
ω ∈Ω : lim
t→∞
at(ω) = (N,N )
}
.
We wish to show that P(A∞I | θ = H) = P(A
∞
N | θ = L) = 1. Consider the latter equality. It
would suffice to show that there exists a p ∈ (0,1) such that no player invests when his
private belief is below p. In the state θ = L, players’ private beliefs almost surely converge
to 0 (since they can learn from their own signals) and hence will eventually fall below p,
leading both players to not invest from some point on. We derive such a p.
When a player has belief p, the payoff from investing is at most (1−δ)(p−c)+δ(p(1−c))
and the payoff from not investing is at least 0. Hence, if a player finds it optimal to invest
at p, then
p ≥
c − cδ
1− cδ
.
Hence, we can define p = c−cδ1−cδ . It now follows that P(A
∞
N | θ = L) = 1.
We next show P(A∞I | θ = H) = 1. Consider the event B
∞ = {ω ∈ Ω : limt→∞pit(ω) =
1 for both i = 1,2}. We know that P(B∞ | θ = H) = 1. Hence, it suffices to show that
B∞ ⊆ A∞I .
15
Let ω ∈ B∞. It suffices to show that on the outcome path induced by ω, there must
only be finitely many cool-off periods. Suppose not. Then, there exist infinitely many
cool-off periods in ω. Recall from Proposition 1 that a player invests with probability one
in an investment phase when his private belief is above p¯ = c(1 + 2ε). Now, since ω ∈ B∞,
there exists a T¯ such that pit(ω) > p¯ for all t ≥ T¯ for both i = 1,2. Now, let t
′ be the starting
period of the first cool-off phase after T¯ . Then, T (t′) + t′ ≥ T¯ . Hence, when this cool-off
period ends at time s = T (t′) + t′ −1, we enter an investment phase. Since this investment
phase at s +1 starts beyond period T ′, the private beliefs of both players would be above
p¯ and both players would invest in time period s+1. Next period, players would continue
to be in the investment phase and again invest. Proceeding this way, players would keep
on investing which means the investment phase would last forever. This contradicts the
fact that there are infinitely many cool-off periods. Hence, there exist only finitely many
cool-off periods in ω, which means that players invest forever after some point of time.
Hence, ω ∈ A∞I . 
Theorem 2 (Payoff Efficiency). Fix any c ∈ (0,1). For every ∆ > 0, there exists δ¯ ∈ (0,1)
such that for each δ ≥ δ¯, there exist a cool-off function T , a constant ε > 0, such that in any
equilibrium σ∗ ∈ S (T ,ε), both players obtain a payoff of at least 1−c−∆ in the state θ =H and
a payoff of at least −∆ in the state θ = L.
Proof. Fix c,∆ ∈ (0,1). Let ε > 0 be small enough so that c < c(1 + 2ε)(1 − ε) < (1− ε)2 and
moreover
(1− ε)2
((
1−
2ε
1− p¯
)
(1− c) +
2ε
1− p¯
(−c)
)
> 1− c −∆. (6)
and
(1− ε)
(
−∆
2
)
− εc > −∆. (7)
where recall from Proposition 1 that p¯ = c(1 + 2ε). In what follows, we will show that
players achieve a payoff equal to the LHS of (6) in state θ = H and a payoff equal to the
LHS of 7 in state θ = L. Let T1 ∈N be such that for any strategy profile which implements
a cool-off scheme T with T (1) = T1, it holds that i) E[piT1 | θ = H] > 1− ε
2 for all i = 1,2;
ii) P[piT1 > 1− ε for each i = 1,2 | θ =H] > 1− ε ; iii) P[piT1 <
∆
2(1−c)+∆ for each i = 1,2 | θ =
H] > 1 − ε . Now let δ¯ ∈ (0,1) be such that δ¯T1 > 1 − ε. Let δ > δ¯. Now, suppose that T0 is
such that condition (4) in Lemma 2 and condition (5) in Proposition 1 are satisfied for T0
and ε. From Proposition 3, it follows that there exists a cool-off function with T (1) = T1
and T (t) ≥ T0 for all t ≥ 2 and there exists an equilibrium of the repeated game restricted
16
to strategies in S (T ,ε). Let σ∗ be one such equilibrium.
We shall show that in this equilibrium each player obtains a long-run expected payoff
of at least 1− c −∆ in the state θ =H and −∆ in state θ = L. We first establish the former.
Note that we have 1− ε > c(1 + 2ε). Hence, if the private beliefs of both players are above
1−ε at the end of the first cool-off phase with length T1, and stay above 1−ε forever, both
players would invest forever. We shall show that the probability with which this happens
is at least 1− 2ε1−p¯ . We argue as follows. Suppose that private beliefs for players 1 and 2 are
p1,p2 ≥ 1−ε at time T1. Hence, from period T1 onwards, the probability that both players
invest forever is at least
P
[
pit > p¯ for each i = 1,2 and t ≥ T1 | piT1 = pi ,pjT1 = pj ,θ =H
]
. (8)
Note that conditional on piT1 = pi ,pjT1 = pj and θ = H , the belief process pit is a bounded
submartingale. Now define the stopping time
Ti(ω) = min{t | pit(ω) ≤ p¯}.
Let p′it be the process pit stopped at time Ti . It follows that p
′
it is a bounded submartingale
as well. From the Martingale Convergence Theorem, it converges almost surely to a limit
p′i,∞. Hence, the conditional probability in (8) is at least
P
[
p′i,∞ > p¯ for each i = 1,2 | piT1 = pi ,pjT1 = pj ,θ =H
]
.
From the Optional Stopping Theorem, we have that
E
[
p′i,∞ | piT1 = pi ,pjT1 = pj ,θ =H
]
≥ pi .
Since 1− p′i,∞ is non-negative and pi ≥ 1 − ε, from Markov’s inequality it follows that for
each i,
P
[
p′i,∞ ≤ p¯ | piT1 = pi ,pjT1 = pj ,θ =H
]
≤
ε
1− p¯
.
From the above we obtain that the probability that both players will invest from period
T1 onwards is at least 1−
2ε
1−p¯ . Hence, the long-run expected payoff to each player in state
θ =H will be at least equal to the LHS of (6) which is greater than 1− c −∆.
Finally, we show that under σ∗, the payoff in state L is at most −∆. To see this, we
first make the following observation. Suppose at the end of the first T1 cool-off periods,
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a player’s private belief is p ≤ ∆2(1−c)+∆ . Now from Lemma 1, we know that a player’s
optimal continuation value v(·) is a non-decreasing convex function of his private belief
p. We show that if the optimal continuation strategy of the player yields payoffs (vH ,vL)
at p, then vL ≥ −
∆
2 . Since (vH ,vL) is the optimal continuation value at p, it follows that the
vector (vH ,vL) supports the convex function v(·) at p. Hence,
v(p) = pvH + (1− p)vL.
Note that v(p) ≥ 0 since a player can always guarantee himself a payoff of zero forever
and vH ≤ 1−c since the best payoff a player can get in state H is 1−c. These, together with
the fact that p ≤ ∆2(1−c)+∆ , imply vL ≥ −
∆
2 . Now, since we have P[piT1 <
∆
2(1−c)+∆ for each i =
1,2 | θ =H] > 1− ε, the ex-ante payoff in state L to each player is at least equal to the LHS
of (7), which is greater than −∆. 
4 Discussion
4.1 Ex-post Equilibria
Most of the literature in repeated games assumes that the set of feasible and individually
rational payoffs is full-dimensional. That is, the dimension of the set is equal to the num-
ber of players. Analogously, existing work in repeated games of incomplete information
assumes a version of full-dimensionality, called statewise full-dimensionality (e.g., Wise-
man, 2005, 2012; Yamamoto, 2011; Sugaya and Yamamoto, 2013). However, our payoff
structure does not satisfy this condition. In addition, two closely related papers to ours,
Yamamoto (2011) and Sugaya and Yamamoto (2013), focus on a special class of sequen-
tial equilibria, called ex-post equilibria. Yet, any ex-post equilibrium is inefficient in our
model, and this is due to the lack of the statewise full-dimensionality. We discuss each of
these two differences in turn.
Statewise Full-dimensionality. For each state θ, we define the set of feasible set of
payoffs by
W (θ) = co
({
v ∈R2 : ∃a ∈ A ∀ i ∈ N ui(a,θ) = vi
})
.
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Figure 3: the Lack of Statewise Full-dimensionality
Further, we define player i’s minimax payoff in state θ by
wi(θ) = min
αj∈∆Aj
max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai ,αj ,θ)
and the set of all feasible and individually rational payoffs in state θ by
W ∗(θ) =
{
w ∈W (θ) : ∀ i ∈ N wi ≥ wi(θ)
}
.
Statewise full-dimensionality is said to be satisfied if the set W ∗(θ) is of dimension
equal to the number of players for each θ.6 The statewise full-dimensionality is assumed
in most of the literature of repeated games of incomplete information, but it is not in
our model. As drawn in Figure 3, the set W ∗(H) is of dimension 2, but the set W ∗(L) =
{(0,0)} is not. Intuitively speaking, this lack of statewise full-dimensionality means that
players’ incentives, thus behavior, are quite different from state to state. This could make
it difficult to design an appropriate punishment scheme that supports cooperation.
Ex-post Equilibria. Two closely related papers to ours, Yamamoto (2011) and Sugaya
and Yamamoto (2013), focus on a special class of sequential equilibria, called ex-post equi-
libria. An ex-post equilibrium is defined as a sequential equilibrium in the infinitely re-
peated game in which the strategies are such that they would be optimal even if the state
θ were common knowledge. In an ex-post equilibrium, player i’s continuation play after
history hit is optimal regardless of the state θ for each hit (including off-path histories).
6When there is no uncertainty of payoff-relevant states, statewise full-dimensionality is equivalent to
the full-dimensionality in the literature of repeated games of complete information.
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No ex-post equilibrium, however, can approximate efficiency in our model. More
precisely, in any ex-post equilibrium, neither player invests at any private history. To see
this, note that in any ex-post equilibrium, a player’s strategy would be optimal if the state
L were common knowledge. Since in the state L, a player’s best response to any strategy
of the opponent is to not invest at any private history, the player never invests even in the
state H . Thus, neither player ever invests in any ex-post equilibrium.
Ex-post equilibria may yield a trivial play if the payoff structure does not satisfy state-
wise full-dimensionality. Further, they may not exist if a stage game is like a global game.
To see this, suppose, for example, that there is another state in which irrespective of the
opponent’s action, a player gains payoff 1 − c if he invests and payoff of 0 if he does not.
Then, players always invest if that state were common knowledge, but they would never
invest if the state L were common knowledge; therefore, there would not exist ex-post
equilibria.
4.2 Common Learning
A coordination game which is very similar to ours is presented as one of the motivations
for the introduction of the concept of common learning by Cripps et al. (2008). We now
explain this concept, and show that, in our game, common learning is attained in every
strategy profile.
Recall Ω := Θ × A∞ × (X2)∞ is the set of all possible outcomes. Any strategy profile
σ = (σi ,σj ) induces a probability measure P on Ω which is endowed with the σ-algebra
F generated by cylinder sets. For each F ∈ F and q ∈ (0,1), define the event B
q
it(F) = {ω ∈
Ω : P(F | at−1,xti ) ≥ q}. Now, define the following events:
1. B
q
t (F) = B
q
it(F)∩B
q
jt(F). That is, this is the event that both players assign probability
at least q to the event F on the basis of their private information.
2. [B
q
t ]
n(F) = B
q
t (B
q
t (B
q
t ...B
q
t (F))). That is, this is the event that both players assign prob-
ability at least q that both players assign probability at least q that... both players
assign probability at least q to the event F on the basis of their private information.
3. C
q
t (F) =
⋂
n≥1[B
q
t ]
n(F).
We say that players have common q-belief in event F at ω, at time t, if ω ∈ C
q
t (F). We say
that players commonly learn θ ∈ Θ if for all q ∈ (0,1), there exists a T such that for all
t ≥ T ,
P
[
C
q
t (θ) | θ
]
> q.
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Proposition 4. Let σ be any strategy profile which induces the probability measure P. Then,
under P, players commonly learn the state θ for each θ ∈Θ.
5 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to answer the question of whether rational Bayesian players in
a coordination game, each of whom is receiving private signals about the unknown state
of nature, can both learn to play the action appropriate to the true state and do so in
a manner such that the loss in payoffs becomes negligible as the discount factor goes to
one. The answer, in a simple setup, is affirmative, even though the particular coordination
game we consider does not have properties such as statewise full dimensionality. Future
research can be considered along several dimensions. The obvious extension, which is
most likely straightforward, would be to have an arbitrary finite number of players and
states of nature. A more interesting question is whether our results still hold whenever
the private signal structure is such that players always commonly learn the state. Costly
information acquisition is another possible extension. Finally, another interesting follow-
up to this work would be to see if a similar set of results can be obtained for boundedly
rational players who do not use full Bayesian updating but are constrained by memory
restrictions.
A Appendix
A.1 Strategies
Claim 3. (Equivalence of conditions) Let σi ∈ S (T ,ε) and let σj be any strategy of player j.
Now, suppose at−1 is reached with positive probability under σ = (σi ,σj ). Then,
Pσ
[
ait = I | θ =H,a
t−1
]
= σi(a
t−1)(I |H). (9)
Hence, the conditional probability Pσ
[
ait = I | θ =H,a
t−1
]
is independent of σj .
Proof. Firstly note that since at−1 is reached with positive probability under σ, it is the
case that at−1 is consistent with σi . Hence, the conditional probability in 9 is well-defined.
Pσ
[
ait = I | θ =H,a
t−1
]
=
Pσ
[
ait = I ,θ =H,a
t−1
]
Pσ [θ =H,at−1]
,
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The numerator is equal to
∑
xti∈X
t
∑
xtj∈X
t
f H (xti )f
H (xtj )
[ t−1∏
τ=1
σi(x
τ
i ,a
τ−1)(aiτ)
(
σi(x
t
i ,a
t−1)(I )
)][ t−1∏
τ=1
σj (x
τ
j ,a
τ−1)(ajτ)
]
=
[ ∑
xti∈X
t
f H (xti )
t−1∏
τ=1
σi(x
τ
i ,a
τ−1)(aiτ)
(
σi(x
t
i ,a
t−1)(I )
)][ ∑
xtj∈X
t
f H (xtj )
t−1∏
τ=1
σj(x
τ
j ,a
τ−1)(ajτ)
]
.
The equality follows from the fact that signals are conditionally independent across play-
ers, whichmeans that the probability that players receive signals (xti ,x
t
j ) is equal to f
H(xti )f
H(xtj ).
By the same token, the denominator is equal to
∑
xti∈X
t
∑
xtj∈X
t
f H (xti )f
H (xtj )
[ t−1∏
τ=1
σi(x
τ
i ,a
τ−1)(aiτ)
][ t−1∏
τ=1
σj(x
τ
j ,a
τ−1)(ajτ)
]
.
=
[ ∑
xti∈X
t
f H (xti )
t−1∏
τ=1
σi(x
τ
i ,a
τ−1)(aiτ)
][ ∑
xtj∈X
t
f H(xtj )
t−1∏
τ=1
σj(x
τ
j ,a
τ−1)(ajτ)
]
.
Now, notice that since the denominator is strictly positive, it follows that the term
∑
xtj∈X
t
f H (xtj )
t−1∏
τ=1
σj (x
τ
j ,a
τ−1)(ajτ)
in the denominator is also strictly positive. This terms also cancels out from the numera-
tor and the denominator and we obtain
Pσ
[
ait = I | θ =H,a
t−1
]
=
∑
xti∈X
t
f H (xti )
[ t−1∏
τ=1
σi(x
τ
i ,a
τ−1)(aiτ)
(
σi(x
t
i ,a
t−1)(I )
)]
∑
xti∈X
t
f H (xti )
[ t−1∏
τ=1
σi(x
τ
i ,a
τ−1)(aiτ)
] ·
Hence, Pσ
[
ait = I | θ =H,a
t−1
]
= σi(a
t−1)(I |H). 
A.2 Two Lemmas
The following lemmas shall be useful in our analysis. The first lemma states that beliefs
in an event—which are a martingale—form a submartingale when conditioned on the
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same event.
Lemma 3. Let F1 ⊆ F2 be sigma-algebras in a finite probability space, let p = P[E | F1] be the
prior probability of some event E, and let q = P[E | F2] be its posterior probability. Then,
E[q | E,p] =
E[q2 | p]
E[q | p]
≥ p.
Proof. Since the space is finite, we can write
E[q | E,p] =
∑
x∈[0,1]
x ·P[q = x | E,p].
By Bayes’ law,
=
∑
x∈[0,1]
x ·P[E | q = x,p] ·
P[q = x | p]
P[E | p]
.
Note that P[E | p] = p, and that since F1 ⊆ F2, P[E | q = x,p] = x. Hence
=
∑
x∈[0,1]
x2 ·
P[q = x | p]
p
=
1
p
E[q2 | p].
Again using the fact that F1 ⊆ F2, p = E[q | p], we have shown that
=
E[q2 | p]
E[q | p]
·
Finally, this is at least p, since E[(q − p)2 | p] ≥ 0, and since E[q | p] = p, and so E[q2 | p] ≥
p2. 
The next lemma states that if a random variable taking values in the unit interval has
a mean close to one, then it must assume values close to one with high probability.
Lemma 4. Let X be a random variable which takes values in [0,1]. Suppose E[X] ≥ 1 − ε2
where ε ∈ (0,1). Then,
P[X > 1− ε] ≥ 1− ε.
Proof. Define the random variable Y = 1−X. Note that it suffices to show that
P[Y ≥ ε] ≤ ε. (10)
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Since E[Y ] ≤ ε2, and since Y is non-negative, by Markov’s inequality, we obtain (10). 
A.3 Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Claim 1. The conclusion follows by definition. If {σni }n ⊆ σ
n
i and σ
n
i → σ
∗
i in the
weak-* topology. Since the support of each σni is contained in Si(T ), so is the support of
σ∗i . It also follows that any convex combination σ
λ
i = λσi+(1−λ)σ
′
i of two mixed strategies
σi ,σ
′
i ∈ Σi(T ) also belongs to Σi(T ). 
Proof of Claim 2. We first argue that Σi(T ,ε) is closed. Suppose {σ
n
i } ⊆ Σi(T ,ε) and
suppose σni → σ
∗
i in the weak-* topology. Firstly, note that from Claim 1, it follows
that σ∗i ∈ Σi(T ). Now suppose a
t−1 in an investment phase and is consistent with σ∗i .
Then, the denominator of σ∗i (a
t−1)(I |H), as defined, will be strictly positive. This means
that for large n, the denominator of σni (a
t−1)(I |H) will be strictly positive also. This
means that at−1 is consistent with σni for large n. It follows from the definition that
σni (a
t−1)(I |H)→ σ∗i (a
t−1)(I |H) which implies that σ∗i (a
t−1)(I |H) ≥ 1− ε.
We now show convexity. Let σi ,σ
′
i ∈ Σi(T ,ε) be two mixed strategies let λ ∈ (0,1). Now,
consider the mixed strategy defined as σλi = λσi + (1−λ)σ
′
i . Then, we show σ
λ
i ∈ Σi(T ,ε).
Clearly σλi ∈ Σi(T ) since Σi(T ) is convex from Claim 1. Let σ¯j be the strategy of player j
that plays each action with probability 1/2 at each private history. Denote as Pλ, P and
P
′, the probability measures induced by the strategy profiles (σλi ,σj ), (σi ,σj ) and (σ
′
i ,σj ).
Note that Pλ = λP+ (1−λ)P′.
We wish to show that σλi also satisfies condition 3. To this end, let a
t−1 be an action
history in an investment phase that is consistent with σλi . It follows that a
t−1 is reached
with positive probability under σλi . Then, from Claim 9, it suffices to show that
P
λ
[
ait = I | θ =H,a
t−1
]
≥ 1− ε.
Now, note by hypothesis, since σi ,σ
′
i ∈ Σi(T ,ε), we already have thatP
[
ait = I ,θ =H,a
t−1
]
≥
(1−ε)P
[
θ =H,at−1
]
andP′
[
ait = I ,θ =H,a
t−1
]
≥ (1−ε)P′
[
θ =H,at−1
]
. These, together im-
ply that
λP
[
ait = I ,θ =H,a
t−1
]
+ (1−λ)P′
[
ait = I ,θ =H,a
t−1
]
λP [θ =H,at−1] + (1−λ)P′ [θ =H,at−1]
≥ 1− ε,
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Figure 4: the continuation value v(p)
which is equivalent to
P
λ
[
ait = I | θ =H,a
t−1
]
=
P
λ
[
ait = I ,θ =H,a
t−1
]
Pλ [θ =H,at−1]
≥ 1− ε.

Proof of Lemma 1. Denote by p player i’s belief at the action history at−1. For each possi-
ble continuation strategy s of player i (which we think of as depending only on his future
signals) let vH and vL denote the expected payoff in the high and low state, respectively,
so that the expected payoff for the continuation strategy s is given by pvH + (1 − p)vL. In
any best response of player i, his expected payoff is given by
v(p) = max
s
{
pvH + (1− p)vL
}
,
where the maximization is over all continuation strategies for player i. Since it is the max-
imum of convex functions, it is convex. To see that it is increasing, note that continuation
value vL ≤ 0 for every continuation strategy s, that vL = vH = 0 for some continuation strat-
egy s—specifically in the strategy in which the player never invests. Hence the derivative
of continuation payoff v(p) is at least 0 at p = 0, and thus continuation payoff v(p), as a
function of belief p, has a non-negative subderivative in the entire interval [0,1]. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Denote by p player i’s belief at the action history at−1. Let s∗I be the
strategy in which player i invests at at−1 and then never again. The conditional payoffs
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for this strategy are
v∗H ≥ (1− δ)(1− c− ε), v
∗
L = −(1− δ)c.
where the former holds true because the opponent invests with probability at least 1 − ε
in the state θ =H .
Let sN be any strategy in which player i does not invest at a
t−1. Then, because of the
cool-off scheme, the payoffs for this strategy are
vNH ≤ δ
T0 . (11)
Let sI be any strategy in which player i invests at a
t−1. Then
vIL ≤ −(1− δ)c. (12)
Assume by contradiction that it is optimal to choose the strategy sI at belief pI and to
choose the strategy sN at belief pN > pI . Recall that the continuation payoff v(p), defined
in the proof of Lemma 1, is supported by the line pvIL + (1 − p)v
I
H at the belief pI and by
pvNL + (1 − p)v
N
H at pN . Since it is non-decreasing and convex (Lemma 1), it follows that
vIH ≤ v
N
H . Inequality (11) implies that v
I
H ≤ δ
T0. By condition (4), we have that vIH < v
∗
H .
By inequality (12) we have that vIL ≤ v
∗
L, and thus the continuation strategy s
∗
I strictly
dominates sI for any belief p , 0. Hence, the continuation strategy sI cannot be optimal
in such a belief. Moreover, it cannot be optimal at the belief p = 0 either, since it is better
to not invest. We have thus reached a contradiction. 
Proof of Corollary 1. It suffices to establish the corollary in the case where s = t+1. That
is, as−1 = at = (at−1, (I , I )). Now, we have,
E
[
pit+1 | θ =H,a
t−1,ait = I ,ajt = I
]
≥ E
[
pit+1 | θ =H,a
t−1,ajt = I
]
≥ E
[
pit+1 | θ =H,a
t−1
]
,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that player i uses a threshold rule at
at−1 (Lemma 2), hence conditioning on ait = I increases the expectation of players i’s
private belief. The second inequality follows since player j uses a threshold rule, hence
conditional on ajt = I , player i learns that player j’s belief is above a threshold and hence,
his beliefs move upwards. Now, by the tower property of expectations,
E
[
pit+1 | θ =H,a
t−1
]
= E
[
E
[
pit+1 | θ =H,a
t−1,pit
]
| θ =H,at−1
]
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From Lemma 4, and since pit = P[θ =H | a
t−1,xti ], it follows that E[pit+1 | θ =H,a
t−1,pit] ≥
pit almost surely, and so
E
[
pit+1 | θ =H,a
t−1
]
≥ E
[
pit | θ =H,a
t−1
]
.

Proof of Proposition 3. The strategy space Σi is compact. By Claim 2, the set Σi(T ,ε)
is closed, thus compact, and convex. Payoffs are continuous, which follows from the fact
that they are discounted exponentially and that the topology on Σi is the weak-* topology.
Hence, by Glicksberg’s Theorem, the game in which the players are restricted to S (T ,ε)
has a Nash equilibrium σ∗ = (σ∗i ,σ
∗
j ) ∈ S (T ,ε). It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that
this fixed point is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted game, since any best
response to any strategy in Σj(T ,ε) would be in Σi(T ,ε). 
Proof of Proposition 4. We prove the claim in the case of the state θ = H . The proof for
the case of the state θ = L is analogous. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: Fix a strategy profile σ, and suppose that there exists an on-path action history
a¯t−1 ∈ At−1 such that
E[pit | θ =H,a¯
t−1] ≥ 1− ε2
for each i = 1,2. From Lemma 4, it follows that
P[pit > 1− ε | θ =H,a¯
t−1] ≥ 1− ε (13)
We will show that
P
[
C
(1−ε)2
t (H) | θ =H,a¯
t−1
]
≥ (1− ε)2. (14)
Note that beliefs p1t and p2t are independent conditional on the state θ = H and action
history a¯t−1, since private signals are conditionally independent. Now, consider the event
Ft =
{
ω ∈Ω : at−1(ω) = a¯t−1, pit(ω) ≥ 1− ε for each i = 1,2
}
.
Note that from inequality (13), we have P[Ft | θ = H,a¯
t−1] ≥ (1 − ε)2. Hence, it suffices
to show that Ft ⊆ C
(1−ε)2
t (H). By the result of Monderer and Samet (1989), it suffices to
show that the event Ft is (1−ε)
2-evident (i.e., Ft ⊆ B
(1−ε)2
t (Ft)) and that Ft ⊆ B
(1−ε)2
t (H). The
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latter follows since Ft ⊆ B
1−ε
t (H) ⊆ B
(1−ε)2
t (H). Thus, we show the former. At any ω ∈ Ft , in
period t player i’s belief about the event Ft is
P
[
Ft | a¯
t−1,xti
]
≥ pit(ω)P
[
Ft | θ =H,a¯
t−1,xti
]
≥ (1− ε)2.
This implies that ω ∈ B
(1−ε)2
t (Ft). That is, Ft ⊆ B
(1−ε)2
t (Ft). Hence, inequality (14) follows.
Moreover, since C
(1−ε)2
t (H) ⊆ C
(1−ε)2(1−ε2)
t (H), we have that
P
[
C
(1−ε)2(1−ε2)
t (H) | θ =H,a¯
t−1
]
≥ (1− ε)2.
Step 2: Fix any ε ∈ (0,1), and let T¯ ∈N be such that for each i = 1,2 and t ≥ T¯ ,
E
[
pit | θ =H
]
≥ 1−
(
ε2
2
)2
.
Note that there exists such a T¯ , since each player individually learns the state. By the
tower property of conditional expectations,
E[pit | θ =H] = E
[
E
[
pit | θ =H,a
t−1
]
| θ =H
]
From Lemma 4, we have that for each i = 1,2,
P
[
E
[
pit | θ =H,a
t−1
]
≥ 1−
ε2
2
| θ =H
]
≥ 1−
ε2
2
.
Then,
P
[
E
[
pit | θ =H,a
t−1
]
≥ 1− ε2 for each i = 1,2 | θ =H
]
≥ 1− ε2.
Hence, for each t ≥ T¯ ,
P
[
C
(1−ε)2(1−ε2)
t (H) | θ =H
]
≥ (1− ε)2(1− ε2),
which establishes the desired result. 
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B Sequential equilibrium
A behavioral strategy for player i is defined as a map from private histories to probabilities
over actions i.e. σi :
⋃
t≥1
Xt ×At−1 → ∆({I ,NI}). For a given strategy profile σ = (σi ,σj ), we
define continuation values as V θi (σ | ht) for each ht = (a
t−1,xti ,x
t
j ) = (hit ,hjt). This value
represents the long-run expected payoff player i would obtain at history ht , if players
play according to the strategies σ and the state is θ. At period t, depending on the private
history, player i has beliefs about the state of nature and private signals of his opponent
(θ,xt) ∈Θ ×Xt . Player i’s belief function is given by µi :
⋃
tHit → ∆(Θ ×X
t). An assessment
is a pair 〈σ,µ〉 consisting of a behavioral strategy profile σ = (σi)i and belief functions for
each player µ = (µi)i . We use sequential equilibrium as our solution concept, which we
define in the current setting as follows:
Definition 4. An assessment 〈σ∗,µ∗〉 is a sequential equilibrium if:
1. (Sequential Rationality) The strategy profile σ∗ is sequentially rational for each player
given beliefs µ∗. This means, for each hit = (a
t−1,xti ) ∈Hit and σi ∈ Σi ,
∑
(θ,xtj )
µ∗i
(
hit
)(
θ,xtj
)
V θi
(
σ∗ | at−1,xti ,x
t
j
)
≥
∑
(θ,xtj )
µ∗i
(
hit
)(
θ,xtj
)
V θi
(
σi ,σ
∗
−i | a
t−1,xti ,x
t
j
)
. (15)
2. (Consistency) There exists a sequence of profiles of completely mixed strategies (that
assigns positive probability to all actions at all private histories) {σn}n≥1 such that the
belief functions {µn}n≥1 uniquely induced by them satisfy
lim
n→∞
(µni (hit),σ
n
i (hit)) = (µ
∗
i (hit),σ
∗
i (hit)) (16)
for all hit ∈Hit , and convergence is with respect to the product topology on ∆(Θ×X
t)×Ai .
The definition of sequential equilibrium is borrowed from Kreps and Wilson (1982)
and is adapted to our setting. While their definition corresponds to finite extensive-form
games, the extension to the current setting is justified since there are only countably many
information sets for each player and moreover, each information set is finite.
The following Lemma reduces the problem of finding a sequential equilibrium to that
of finding a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5. For every mixed strategy Nash equilibrium σ∗ in our game there exists an outcome
equivalent sequential equilibrium (σ∗∗,µ∗).
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Proof. Suppose σ∗ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. From Kuhn’s theorem, let σ∗b be
an outcome equivalent behavioral strategy profile. It follows that σ∗b is also Nash Equi-
librium of the game. Let σ∗∗ equal σ∗b for on-path histories, and off-path, let both players
play N under σ∗∗. σ∗∗ is still a Nash equilibrium (and clearly outcome equivalent) since
now, off-path, players are guaranteed utility at most zero, whereas before utilities off-path
were non-negative. Also, σ∗∗ is sequentially rational—for any belief system that is consis-
tent with Bayes’ rule on-path—since, if player i never invests then player j’s unique best
response is to also never invest.
We construct the belief system µ∗ as follows. Firstly, note that beliefs on-path are
uniquely determined by Bayes’ rule. Now, for any observable deviation made by the
opponent, an action (one of {I ,N }) was taken even though it is supposed to be chosen
with probability zero. We assume that in µ∗, upon observing such an action, players
update their belief as if they observed the other action, which was supposed to be chosen
with probability one.
To see that µ∗ satisfies consistency, for each n > 1, define the behavioral strategy σni for
each player i = 1,2 as follows
σni (a
t−1,xti ) =

1− 1n if σ
∗∗
i (a
t−1,xti ) = 1
1
n if σ
∗∗
i (a
t−1,xti ) = 0
σ∗∗i (a
t−1,xti ) o.w.
(17)
Note that σni chooses each action at each private history with positive probability. In
particular, σn differs from σ∗∗ in that whenever under σ∗∗ player i chooses an action with
probability one, under σn player i chooses that same action instead with probability 1 −
1
n . Note that this change does not depend on the agent’s private history. Hence, when
an observable deviation occurs under σ∗∗, the beliefs of the players are unchanged by
assumption and are close to the beliefs generated by σn as n tends to infinity. 
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